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Abstract Rateless codes (a.k.a. fountain codes, digital fountain) have found
their way in numerous peer-to-peer based applications although their robust-
ness to the so called pollution attack has not been deeply investigated because
they have been originally devised as a solution for dealing with block erasures
and not for block modification.
In this paper we provide an analysis of the intrinsic robustness of three
rateless codes algorithms, i.e., random linear network codes (RLNC), Luby
transform (LT), and band codes (BC) against intentional data modification.
By intrinsic robustness we mean the ability of detecting as soon as possible
that modification of at least one equation has occurred as well as the possibility
a receiver can decode from the set of equations with and without the modified
ones. We focus on bare rateless codes where no additional information is added
to equations (e.g., tags) or higher level protocol are used (e.g., verification keys
to pre-distribute to receivers) to detect and recover from data modification.
We consider several scenarios that combine both random and targeted
selection of equations to alter and modification of an equation that can either
change the rank of the coding matrix or not. Our analysis reveals that a high
percentage of attacks goes undetected unless a minimum code redundancy is
achieved, LT codes are the most fragile in virtually all scenarios, RLNC and
BC are quite insensitive to the victim selection and type of alteration of chosen
equations and exhibit virtually identical robustness although BC offer a low
complexity of the decoding algorithm.
Keywords Rateless codes · random linear codes · LT codes · band codes ·
data modification attack · pollution attack
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1 Introduction
In the last years, a novel family of asymptotically optimal binary erasure codes,
known as rateless codes [11,9], has gained increasing interest for their flexi-
bility. Rateless codes, as opposed to classical erasure codes, do not require to
fix the coding rate a priori, so that a potentially unlimited sequence of equa-
tions can be generated. Such an approach was also termed digital fountain
or fountain codes [32], the most well known designs being the Luby Trans-
form (LT) [30] and raptor codes [41]. A great deal of research is still going
on to devise rateless codes whose decoding complexity and communication
overhead are reduced [17,36,18,38,40,25,12]; at the same time, the design of
locally repairable codes that allow efficient reconstruction of lost blocks car-
rying equations is still an active source of interesting proposals [4,28,3,39]. A
recent survey [10] nicely summarizes the main developments in rateless codes
research.
Oversimplifying, rateless codes partition a data unit into k data fragments
of equal size in bits. The data fragments are combined into n ≥ k equa-
tions each comprising a coded vector (a list of which data fragments are used
to define the equation) and a coded fragment (the result of xoring the data
fragments indicated by the corresponding coding vector). Each equation is
characterized by its degree, i.e., the number of data fragments defined by the
coding vector, that is mathematically represented by the degree distribution.
The n coding vectors define a k×n coding matrix G (also known as generator
matrix) and the decoding process can be cast as computing k unknowns (the
data fragments composing the data unit) out of a subset of the n equations.
Thanks to their flexibility and simplicity rateless codes have found their
way in numerous fields such as distributed storage [31,2], Wireless Ad Hoc
Networks [16], peer-to-peer based applications [43], communications in 5G
[37], vehicular networks and Internet of Things applications [34,13]. In the
broad area of peer-to-peer rateless codes have been exploited in application
ranging from multimedia delivery to distributed storage systems [47,1,5,42,46,
35]. Some of these papers also dealt with security issues. In particular, a line of
research has focused on the analysis and containment of the so called pollution
attack whereby a set of malicious peers intentionally randomly alter coded
fragments to jam the communication and to avoid recovering of the original
data unit at the receivers [23,8,21]. In these papers malicious peers launch
their attack by randomly modifying the coded fragment of victim equations
before forwarding them to their neighbor peers.
Unfortunately, the rateless codes’ main advantage, i.e. the simplicity of the
mechanism used to generate a practically limitless sequence of data fragments
robust to erasures, also represents their Achilles’ heel: indeed exploiting the
same simplicity an attacker can create plausible data fragments capable to
pollute the original message. The worst, a few polluted fragments are enough
to break completely the decoding process. Since rateless codes have been
originally devised as a solution for dealing with block erasures and not for
block modification little or no attention has been devoted to the vulnerability
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of rateless principle that can be exploited by attackers to modify existing
equations or to create new ones on the fly with the objective to jam or pollute
the communication and to avoid recovering of the data unit at the receiver.
In this paper we provide an attempt to fill this gap and we investigate
the robustness of rateless codes when malicious peers employ more elaborated
attack strategies on equations to be forwarded. In particular, we provide a
comparison of the intrinsic robustness of three rateless codes algorithms, i.e.,
random linear network codes (RLNC) [24], Luby Transform (LT) [30], and
band codes (BC) [20], against intentional data modification. By intrinsic ro-
bustness we mean the ability of receivers to detect as soon as possible that
modification of at least one equation has occurred, and that decoding from
the set of equations with and without the modified ones is still possible.
We focus on bare rateless codes where no additional information is added
to equations, e.g., CRC-like information, or higher level protocol are used, e.g.,
verification keys pre-distributed to receivers, to detect and recover from data
modification. We consider attack strategies where the fragments to modify are
selected either randomly or based on some specific feature aiming at increasing
their malicious impact. The modification of an equation can either alter the
rank of the coding matrix or not.
Our analysis reveals that:
– when the attack load is low, i.e., when only one equation is modified, the
attack goes undetected in a high percentage of cases for all rateless code
algorithms;
– there exists a minimum number of equations to generate to ensure that
detection is always triggered even in a low load attack;
– LT codes are the most fragile with respect to data modification attacks in
virtually all scenarios;
– RLNC and BC are almost insensitive to the victim selection and type of
alteration of victim equations;
– RLNC and BC exhibit virtually identical robustness although BC offer a
low complexity of the decoding algorithm as shown in [20].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the most
closely related works dealing with security issues in rateless codes; Section 3
provides the notation used throughout the paper as well as a quick reference to
how encoding is carried out by RLNC, LT, and BC; then, Section 4 describes
all the details of the scenarios we consider and the definition of robustness
indexes we study; Section 5 presents and comments our experimental results;
finally, Section 6 summarizes the paper contributions, draws conclusions, and
outlines directions for future developments.
For the sake of readability, Table 1 summarizes the key notation used
throughout this paper.
2 Related works
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Meaning Values
rc rateless code {RLNC, LT, BC}
k # data unit fragments {32, 256}
n # equations [k + 4, 1.5k]
p # modified equations [1, 4]
ch victim choice strategy {random, lowest, highest}
md modification strategy {unm, tol, toh}
Table 1 Key notation.
As mentioned in the introduction, the rateless coding principle simplifies the
procedure to create additional coded fragments that in turn can be exploited
by an attacker to modify and inject corrupted data. This kind of problem is also
termed pollution or Byzantine attack. Limited attention has been devoted in
the scientific literature to such intrinsic vulnerability of the rateless principle:
in this section we will briefly review the most closely related research.
Data modification attack has been considered in several paper in the con-
text of peer-to-peer based applications, e.g., [23,8,21]. In these works a set
of malicious peers intentionally alter coded fragments to jam the communi-
cation and to avoid recovering of the original data unit at the receivers by
randomly replacing the coded fragment of victim equations before forwarding
them to their neighbor peers. These works only consider this kind of attack
and develop identification algorithms to spot malicious peers and secure data
communication.
Pollution attack has been also studied in the context of network coding
[44], where intermediate nodes may compromise on security. A well known
approach to tackle a Byzantine adversary is to add cryptographic functions,
e.g. hashes or signatures, to each coded fragments [27,22,26]. Besides the addi-
tional computational cost and need of an ancillary secure channel to exchange
cryptographic keys, these solutions are further complicated by the rateless
principle since coded fragments cannot be known and signed in advance as in
the case of fixed rate erasure codes. The works in [48,29] improve these kind
of approaches by introducing homomorphic signature that enables interme-
diate nodes to verify messages without the need of a secure channel for key
pre-distribution. Homomorphic authentication is further enhanced in [29] to
secure regenerating codes in the context of cloud storage with the additional
property of being privacy preserving. In [14] improved key distribution schemes
for homomorphic subspace signature for network coding is proposed.
Few works have analyzed the effect of data modification on rateless codes
in general, outside the context of a particular application such as network
coding or cloud storage. Closer to our work the approach in [33] considers a
wireless scenario where one wishes that the legitimate user receives enough
fountain packets to decode first as opposed to attackers that want to get the
private message. In this case the attacker is a receiver only and cannot inject
corrupted data. In [15] the authors propose to counteract the vulnerability of
rateless codes to coded fragment modification by designing a specific coding
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strategy that is resilient to Byzantine attacks when the fraction of corrupted
packets is guaranteed to be less than 1/3 of the total coded fragments. As
opposed to our study this amounts at using ad-hoc coding/decoding solutions.
3 Background on rateless codes
A rateless encoder partitions a data unit into k data fragmentsm = (m1, . . . ,mk)
of equal size of z bits and then generates n (n ≥ k) coded fragments y =
(y1, . . . , yn) according to some coding algorithm rc . Each coded fragment
yi is computed as a linear combination (binary XOR operation) of the data
fragments: every coded fragments is associated to a coding equation or coding
vector. This latter is a column k×1 binary vector g = (g1, . . . , gk)′ with gj = 1
if the j-th data fragments mj is selected for combination, and gj = 0 other-
wise. Each coding equation is characterized by its degree d, i.e., the number
of data fragments defined by the coding vector (number of 1s signaled in the
vector). The coding vectors of all n coded fragments can be arranged column-
wise to form a k × n coding matrix G (also known as generator matrix) and
any linear block code can be represented as linear mapping y = mG, through
the k × n coding matrix, with addition and multiplication defined in the bi-
nary Galois field. In turn, the decoding process can be cast as computing k
unknowns mi out of a subset of the n coded fragments. For instance, this goal
can be achieved by using Gaussian elimination [6] to solve the linear problem
yS = mGS , where yS represents a subset of the coded fragments indexed
by set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, and GS are the corresponding equations, i.e. columns
in the generator matrix. The linear problem can be solved if GS comprises
exactly k linear independent equations. If n coded fragments are needed to
decoding we define the overhead of the code as ǫ = n/k − 1.
In this paper the values of rc we analyze are RLNC [24], LT [30], and BC
[20]; in the rest of this section we briefly sketch the algorithms to compute
coded fragments y in each case and we refer the reader to the original papers
for full details.
3.1 LT algorithm to compute equations
LT [30] are known as the first codes designed according to the rateless prin-
ciple while retaining linear decoding complexity and asymptotically optimal
property, i.e. ǫ → 0 for k → ∞. The key to LT success is related to the Ro-
bust Soliton distribution µ(c, δ) (RSD) from which the degree d of each yi is
sampled (c and δ are two parameters that shape the distribution). The RSD
enforces mostly low degree equations (the peak of the RSD is for d = 2) and
few high degree equations: in particular, it is designed so that it is possible to
decode by looking for equations with d = 1 (of kind yi = mj), xoring the data
fragments mj from all remaining equations (that will get degree lowered by 1)
and iterating the process.
6 Rossano Gaeta, Marco Grangetto
3.2 RLNC algorithm to compute equations
Before the advent of rateless codes a lot of work has been devoted to the so
called network coding, and in particular RLNC [24], where some limitations
of classical store and forward approach followed in packed switched networks
could be solved by applying linear coding to packets. In this case, a new coded
fragment yi is generated by any random combination of data fragments: it
turns out that on average one gets d = k/2. As opposed to LT the decoding
complexity is high and must be based on Gaussian elimination.
3.3 BC algorithm to compute equations
BC aim at striking a balance between LT and RLNC in terms of complexity
[20]. To this end, the random approach is retained only within the so called
encoding windows or band, whose size W < k is constrained by design. To
encode yi first the leading edge f of the window is selected, then only data
fragments mf , . . . ,mf+W−1 can are combined randomly. To get a functional
design one needs to adopt some modifications to the presented basic principle
taking into consideration the cases when the encoding band approaches the
trailing edge of the coding block, i.e. when (f + W − 1) > k. We refer the
interested reader to [20] for details. The key point of BC is that the average
value of d turns to be W/2 and allowing one to control the decoding complexity
and overhead. As for RLNC Gaussian elimination decoder is required.
4 Scenario description
We consider a simple abstract scenario composed of:
– a transmitter that encodes a data unit partitioned in k data fragments
m = (m1, . . . ,mk) and sends n coded fragments y = (y1, . . . , yn) according
to some coding algorithm rc for rateless codes as described in Section 3.
The generation of equations is iterated until G is full rank, i.e., the n
equations include a set of k linearly independent equations from which it
is possible to recover the data unit m.
– an attacker that can intentionally modify a subset of p equations (1 ≤ p ≤
n);
– a receiver that is fed with the set of n equations including the modified
ones.
The subset of p modified equations can be selected according to three possible
strategies ch:
– a random subset of cardinality p is selected as the victim equations of the
data modification attack (random strategy);
– p equations corresponding to those with the highest degree are selected
(highest strategy);
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– p equations corresponding to those with the lowest degree are selected
(lowest strategy).
Please note that this abstract mechanism to select victim equations can be
mapped onto different more realistic attack models. For instance, the random
strategy could represent an attacker that has only a partial view of the set of
n equations and it is only able to intercept p of them because the remaining
n − p follow different paths from data source to destinations. highest and
lowest strategies could be employed by a set of malicious storage nodes in
a distributed storage system; these attackers collectively share a partial yet
larger view of the set of n equations and can select victim equations based on
their degree.
Finally, for each choice strategy ch the modification of an equation can
occur in three different ways. The equation degree can change by:
– leaving the coding vector unaltered and by randomly substituting the coded
fragment value (unm);
– replacing the original coding vector by a fake one involving only a single
randomly selected data fragment (tol). This amounts to setting the degree
of the modified equation to 1;
– replacing the original coding vector by a fake one involving all data frag-
ments composing the data unit (toh). This amounts to setting the degree
of the modified equation to k.
The receiver uses the decoding algorithm in [6] for recovering the data unit
from the set of n equations. Detection of data unit modification is carried out
by a trivial extension of a Gauss elimination algorithm where at each step a
check is performed to verify if an inconsistency in the progressive solution of a
redundant system of linear equation is found. Although such algorithm cannot
raise an alert when none of the equations has been altered the detection of
modification might fail, instead. In the simplest case, a detection failure might
occur when all n equations are absolutely necessary for decoding, i.e., when
all subsets of n − 1 equations do not include a set of k linearly independent
equations.
4.1 Robustness indexes
We evaluate robustness of rateless codes along three dimensions by the follow-
ing indexes:
– detection robustness rdet is the probability that detection of modified equa-
tions is triggered;
– attack robustness ratt is the probability that recover of the original data
unit is still possible after removal of modified equations occurs;
– detection earliness edet is the average number of equations processed by the
detector before issuing an alert normalized with respect to k. Therefore, it




where smaller values represent earlier detection
of a modification attack on a data unit.
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The ideally robust rateless code should have the first two indexes as close to
1 as possible and a detection earliness as small as possible.
5 Results
In this section we present the architecture of the test-bed we developed to
analyze and characterize the robustness of rateless codes as well as results for
robustness indexes as defined in Section 4.1.
5.1 Setup
To evaluate the robustness of rateless codes against data modification we
developed C++ prototypes representing our test−bed for the simulation of
the interaction among transmitter, attacker, and receiver. In particular, the
test−bed includes the following components:
– the generator whose task is to encode n ≥ k equations according to the
chosen rateless coding algorithm rc;
– the attacker module, that modifies p equations according to choice strate-
gies ch and equation degree strategy md as described in Section 4.
– the decoder that is implemented according to the Gaussian Elimination
method proposed in [6]. The decoder consumes one equation at a time to
progressively simplify the system of linear equations; it is capable to return
an alert to signal that the data unit has been corrupted as discussed in
Section 4 as well as the number of equations processed when detection
occurs for the first time.
To characterize the robustness of a rateless code algorithm rc we ran
100,000 independent trials for each combination of system parameters repre-
sented by the 6−tuple (rc, n, k, p, ch,md) for the values summarized in Table
1. Each trial is organized as follows: n equations are generated that define a full
rank coding matrix G and p of them are chosen according to ch and modified
according to md. The decoder is invoked on the set of n equations to verify if
decoding is possible and a data modification alert is possibly triggered by the
detector. Finally, the decoder is newly invoked on the set of n− p unmodified
equations to verify if recover of the original data unit is still possible.
Robustness indexes defined in Section 4.1 are estimated as the fraction of
trials that:
– trigger the detector (rdet);
– allow one to recover the original data unit from the n − p unmodified
equations (ratt).
The index edet is obtained as the average value of the number of equations
processed by the detector before issuing an alert normalized with respect to
k. Finally, for LT we used a Robust Soliton distribution µ(c, δ) where c = 0.05
and δ = 0.01 and for BC we considered a band size W = 3k4 .





























(rc = *, k = 32, n = ∗, p = 1, ch = random,md = tol) (left) and as a function of the
number of modified equations p for scenarios (rc = *, k = 32, n = k + 4, p = ∗, ch =
random,md = tol) (right).
5.2 Impact on detection robustness rdet
k rc
random lowest highest
unm tol toh unm tol toh unm tol toh
32
RLNC .937 .968 .968 .937 .968 .968 .937 .968 .968
LT .901 .962 .952 .883 .960 .935 .922 .964 .962
BC .935 .968 .968 .935 .969 .967 .936 .968 .968
256
RLNC .939 .968 .968 .935 .969 .966 .941 .967 .973
LT .870 .949 .935 .870 .942 .930 .897 .954 .950
BC .936 .965 .966 .937 .967 .970 .936 .972 .967
Table 2 Detection robustness rdet as a function of choice strategies ch and degree modifi-
cation md for n = k + 4, and p = 1.
Detection robustness rdet represents the probability the detector triggers
an alert to signal that data modification has occurred and that the data unit
recovered by the decoder is not valid. It is an increasing function of both
normalized redundancy n
k
and the number of modified equations p. For n
k
= 1.5
detection robustness approaches 1 for all scenarios, i.e., detection is always
triggered; the same result is obtained when p = 4 in all other settings. Figure 1




(rc = *, k = 32, n = ∗, p = 1, ch = random,md = tol) where a single
equation is modified. Analogously, Figure 1 (right graph) displays results as
a function of the number of modified equations p for scenarios (rc = *, k =
32, n = k + 4, p = ∗, ch = random,md = tol). It can be noted that a
stealth attack in a low redundancy setting is by far the most insidious scenario
since the probability the attack goes undetected (which is equal to 1− rdet) is
unacceptably high. Indeed, about 3−4% of the attacks where only 1 equation is
modified goes undetected for all rateless code algorithms. Furthermore, Table
2 shows that RLNC and BC are quite insensitive to how victim equations

































Fig. 2 Attack robustness ratt as a function of normalized redundancy
n
k
for scenarios (rc =
*, k = 32, n = ∗, p = 1, ch = random,md = tol) (left) and as a function of the number of




unm tol toh unm tol toh unm tol toh
1
RLNC .937 .937 .937 .937 .937 .937 .937 .937 .937
LT .901 .901 .901 .883 .882 .883 .922 .922 .922
BC .935 .935 .935 .935 .935 .935 .936 .936 .936
4
RLNC .306 .306 .306 .307 .308 .307 .308 .308 .308
LT .216 .216 .216 .166 .166 .166 .267 .267 .267
BC .304 .304 .304 .303 .303 .303 .305 .304 .305
Table 3 Attack robustness ratt as a function of choice strategies ch and degree modification
md for k = 32 and n = k + 4.
are chosen and modified while LT codes suffer the worst performance that do
depend on ch and md. In particular, up to about 12−13% of data modification
attacks goes undetected when the ch =lowest equations are selected and only
the value of the coded fragment is randomly altered, i.e., when md =unm. The
attack strategy where the coding vector is unaltered and only the value of the
coded fragment is changed has also a harder impact on RLNC and BC: in this
case about 7% of attacks is missed by the detector.
Results in Table 2 also show that conclusions are independent of the value
of k. Indeed, we obtained very similar results for all values of k tested in the
range [32, 256]; therefore, to avoid cluttering graphs and tables in the sequel
we only present results for the case k = 32.
5.3 Impact on attack robustness ratt
Attack robustness ratt represents the probability that recovering the original
clean data unit is still possible after removal of the modified equations. It rep-
resents a lower bound on the actual recovery capability since we are implicitly
assuming that a perfect identifier of modified equations is available.




































(rc = *, k = 32, n = ∗, p = 1, ch = random,md = tol) (left) and as a function of the
number of modified equations p for scenarios (rc = *, k = 32, n = k + 4, p = ∗, ch =
random,md = tol) (right).
Figure 2 (left graph) depicts ratt as a function of normalized redundancy
n
k
for scenarios (rc = *, k = 32, n = ∗, p = 1, ch = random,md = tol)
(where a single equation is modified). Figure 2 (right graph) displays results
as a function of the number of modified equations p for scenarios (rc = *, k =
32, n = k + 4, p = ∗, ch = random,md = tol).




it is markedly decreasing as a function of the number of modified equations p.
For n
k
= 1.5 attack robustness approaches 1 for all scenarios, i.e., recovery is
always possible.
We also note that in a low redundancy scenario the possibility of recovery
quickly deteriorates as the data modification attack gets harsher; for p = 4 it
is almost impossible for all rateless code algorithms to avoid disruption of the
data unit.
Again, Table 3 shows that while RLNC and BC are quite insensitive to
how victim equations are chosen and modified, LT codes suffer the worst per-
formance among all rateless code algorithms. In particular, when only one
equation is modified LT is not able to survive a data modification attack in
about 12% of the cases when lowest degree equations are selected as victims
regardless the actual modification choice.
5.4 Impact on detection earliness edet
Detection earliness edet is the average number of equations processed by the
detector before issuing an alert normalized with respect to k. It ranges in




] where smaller values represent more prompt detection of
a modification attack on a data unit. Figure 3 (left graph) depicts edet as
a function of normalized redundancy n
k
for scenarios (rc = *, k = 32, n =
∗, p = 1, ch = random,md = tol). It can be noted that the average number
of equations to be processed by the detector before issuing an alert is almost
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p rc
random lowest highest
unm tol toh unm tol toh unm tol toh
1
RLNC 1.030 1.030 1.029 1.028 1.027 1.027 1.028 1.027 1.027
LT 1.028 0.996 1.023 1.035 0.981 1.034 0.999 0.997 1.012
BC 1.030 1.029 1.030 1.027 1.026 1.027 1.027 1.026 1.027
4
RLNC .989 .964 .461 .988 .959 .398 .988 .959 .398
LT .974 .852 .458 1.00 .751 .238 .940 .897 .241
BC .989 .963 .461 .988 .956 .388 .988 .957 .388
Table 4 Detection earliness edet as a function of choice strategies ch and degree modifica-
tion md for k = 32 and n = k + 4.
always greater than or equal to k. In this case LT allow for the earliest detection
among all three codes.
Figure 3 (right graph) shows edet as a function of the number of modified
equations p for scenarios (rc = *, k = 32, n = k+4, p = ∗, ch = random,md =
tol). We observe that the higher the number of modified equations the earlier
detection occurs. Again, LT reveals as the most reactive rateless code in this
comparison.
Finally, Table 4 shows that reactivity of detection is quite similar for all
rateless codes in all scenarios. When the number of modified equations is
higher we observe that regardless the rateless code algorithm and the choice
strategy of victim equations the data modification attack that triggers the
most reactive detection is md =toh. In all cases results confirm that LT is by
far the most reactive rateless code; they also show that RLNC and BC exhibit
almost identical results.
5.5 Discussion
A comprehensive and rigorous theoretical analysis of the robustness of codes
we considered against all kind of attacks could be rather complex. Nevertheless,
results characterizing detection robustness rdet and attack robustness ratt for
scenarios (rc = *, k = ∗, n = k + 4, p = 1, ch = random,md = unm) (Tables
2 and 3) could be explained by resorting to the analysis of the probability
that coding matrix G is full rank k when n equations are available to the
decoder (we denote it as pfr(n, k)). Analytical expressions of pfr(n, k) for
RLNC are given in [45,49] while numerical solutions for LT is provided by [19].
Unfortunately, there is no analytical or numerical solution for BC although
simulations show that for band size W >
√
k results are close to those for
RLNC.
In the experiments, we generated equations according to the chosen coding
algorithm and we selected a set whose size is n such that it defines a full rank k
coding matrixG. Under random selection of a victim equation (ch = random)
and modification of its coded fragment (md = unm) the rank of coding matrix
G remains unaltered. In this case, modification of one equation just results
in the redefinition of a new system of linear equations to be solved. If none
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of the n subsets of equations whose cardinality is equal to n − 1 defines a
rank k coding matrix then it is inevitable not to detect any change in the
entire set of n equations encoding the original data unit. This event occurs
with probability 1 − pfr(n−1)
pfr(n)
, i.e., the probability that decoding is possible




for k = 32: we obtained 0.9375 and 0.9141 for RLNC and
LT, respectively. These values are in excellent agreement with those we show
in Table 2. We also computed the same quantities for k = 256: we obtained
0.9375 for RLNC (in excellent agreement with results in Table 2) but we could
not do the same for LT since the numerical approach in [19] becomes unstable
for k > 64.
A similar analysis can also explain results for attack robustness ratt in
the same scenarios. Indeed,
pfr(n−1)
pfr(n)
we previously computed for detection
robustness rdet also represents the probability that decoding is still possible
even if we remove the randomly selected victim equation. Also in this case,
it can be noted that they are in excellent agreement with those presented in
Table 3. More generally, when p victim equations are removed from the set




. For instance, for k = 32 when p = 4 we compute 0.3076
and 0.2146 for RLNC and LT, respectively. These values are almost identical
to those presented in Table 3.
Unfortunately, both degree targeted selection of victim equations and its
degree modification can modify the rank of coding matrix G making theoret-
ical analysis of results a lot more complex.
6 Conclusions and Future Works
Rateless codes have found their way in numerous peer-to-peer base applica-
tions but since they have been originally devised as a solution for dealing with
block erasures and not for block modification little or no attention has been
devoted to the analysis of their robustness when malicious peers modify exist-
ing equations on the fly with the goal to avoid recovering of the original data
unit at the receiver.
In this paper we provided an attempt to fill this gap and we investigated
the robustness of rateless codes when malicious peers employ more elaborated
attack strategies on equations to be forwarded. We analyzed by means of a
full C++ implementation of a test−bed composed of encoders, decoders, and
detector the intrinsic robustness of three rateless code algorithms against in-
tentional modification of equations. We focused on bare rateless codes where
no additional information is added to equations or higher level protocol are
used, e.g., verification keys to pre-distribute to receivers to detect and recover
from data modification. We formalized the term intrinsic robustness by three
indexes: detection robustness, attack robustness, and detection earliness that
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we evaluated in a large number of scenarios for all combinations of code pa-
rameters and attack strategies.
Our analysis provided several interesting observations: a high percentage
of attacks goes undetected unless a minimum code redundancy is achieved, LT
codes are the most fragile with respect to data modification attacks in virtually
all scenarios, RLNC and BC are quite insensitive to the victim selection and
type of alteration of victim equations and exhibit virtually identical robustness
although BC offer a low complexity of the decoding algorithm [20].
Future developments include the analysis of a detector based on optimal
intermediate decoders for rateless codes [7], the extension of the test−bed with
a non−ideal algorithm to identify modified equations [2] and the analysis of
additional rateless codes and type of attacks. e.g., those in [15].
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